[VoL 127:1174

BOOK REVIEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. By Laurence H. Tribe.
The Foundation Press, Inc., 1978. Pp. lxix, 1202. Price $22.50.
ROBERT

F.

NAGELt

Like Walt Whitman's persona in "Song of Myself," Professor
Tribe's long-awaited treatise contains multitudes; any particular
description can be contradicted by some aspect of the book. American ConstitutionalLaw' is an innovative effort to infuse moral advocacy into legal scholarship, but it is also, in many places, a rather
traditional hornbook.2 Although' the book is generally accurate
and often brilliant, its treatment of some issues is misleading and
limited. 3 Tribe's writing is overtly opinionated and judgmental but
f Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado. B.A. 1968, Swarthmore
College; J.D. 1972, Yale University. The author is grateful to each of the many
individuals who were generous enough to read and comment on earlier drafts of
this Review.
I L. TME, AEmacAN CONSTUTIONAL LAw (1978).
2 On the whole, the treatment of structural issues-for example, the chapters
on the judicial power, the executive power, the legislative power, and the limits of
state and local power-is more traditional than the treatment of substantive issuesfor example, the equal protection clause. The more traditional sections will probably
receive less public attention but are often excellent
3 No real effort is made to deal at length with some issues, such as the antimajoritarian difficulty and the relevance of institutional factors. Tribe states at the
outset that he "will proceed on the premise of a relatively large judicial role more
because it has become an historical given than because any ineluctable logic would
have made an alternative course of history unthinkable or patently unwise." L.
TmE, supra note 1, at 13. The limited treatment of other issues seems to have
resulted from the certainty of Tribe's views. For example, Tribe declares that there
is "little to be said" for the decision in Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal.
3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), affd in part, rev'd in part, 98
S. Ct. 2733 (1978). L. TRmIE, supra note 1, at 1048. Similarly, "little can be
said in reply to Justice Marshall's" dissenting comment in Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717, 814-15 (1974), to the effect that the decision might lead to urban
residential segregation. L. TmBE, supra note 1, at 1042. (Of course, a great deal
has been said in favor of the Bakke result; and substantial research has been done
on the question whether demands for school desegregation might themselves be
creating housing segregation. See generally Rossell, Ravitch & Armor, Busing and
"White Flight," 53 PuB. INM=sr 109 (1978). Discussion of other issues is limited
by Tribe's emphasis on imaginative interpretations of cases over more traditional
explanations. It is doubtful that the student reading Tribe's discussion of National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), will come away with much
awareness of the connections between that decision and the inter-governmental
immunity cases. L. TRaBE, supra note 1, at 308-18. Ruth Bader Ginsburg has
expressed puzzlement at Tribe's "extravagant . . . treatment" of this case, which
he interprets as silent support for a "theory of individual rights to certain basic
services exercisable against state and local governments." Ginsburg, Book Review,
92 HAv. L. Rlv. 340, 344 (1978).
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also strives for even-handed evaluation.4 His analyses are useful
and provocative but will also be impenetrable and treacherous for
the uncritical student or judge.5 Although usually honest, the book
The book is rarely misleading in its substantive treatment of major constitutional
concepts. (An exception is the unfortunate failure to distinguish between the
concepts of constitutional balance, which emphasizes interference and functionblurring among the branches of government, and separation of powers, which
emphasizes independence and abstract functional differentiation. See M. VuE, CONsrrUTIoNALjsM AND THE SEPARATIoN oF PowEas 315-50 (1967).)
But Tribe's
frequent use of adjectives in describing specific issues can be misleading. For
instance, he states that the law is "clear" that full procedural protections are required before a prisoner can be given "aversive conditioning." The footnotes,
however, point only to a student note and two lower court opinions that preceded
the major Supreme Court decisions dealing with procedural due process in the
prisons. L. TABE, supra note 1, at 912 nn.8 & 9.
Finally, it is both limited and misleading to use adjectives to divert attention
from analytical difficulties. Tribe considers it merely "paradoxical" that constitutional objections to coercive prison therapies increase in direct proportion to the
therapeutic value of the treatment. Id. 911-12. A difficulty with Tribe's position
that disenfranchisement of prisoners should be constitutionally impermissible is
labeled a "subliminal tension." Id. 772 n.5.
4 Tribe is fair enough to criticize his own prior defense of Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973). L. TRmE, supra note 1, at 928. He expresses doubts about the
wisdom of defining constitutional "rights of personhood," a concept used throughout
the book. Id. 892. Tribe even admits doubts about the "modem tendency" to
treat each constitutional provision as "a set of values whose internal structure may
be coherently elucidated." (He adds, with some understatement, that it is "difficult not to indulge the modem tendency.") Id. 463. At certain points in the
book, he makes imaginative efforts to view cases sympathetically from the perspective of their historical period; for such a treatment of Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905), see L. TRBE, supra note 1, at 439.
However, many of Tribe's efforts at even-handedness are strained. He lukewarmly praises a dissent that argues that the burden of proving frivolity in federal
in forma pauperis actions should not rest with the government as "not completely
unpersuasive." Id. 1104. The Burger Court is somewhat grudgingly described as
"not without its own elements of decency and concern." Id. 1135. Such faint
efforts at even-handed assessment should be contrasted with the uncategorical and
even condescending tone of many of his evaluations: for example, his statements that
a color-blind equal protection standard would be "fundamentally misguided," id.
1048, and that the majority in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973), is "to be commended for achieving a significant degree of
surface plausibility."' L. TamE, supra note 1, at 1122.
5 The book will be difficult to use for a number of reasons. First, evaluative
material is often presented in an overview format before the cases are described, so
that the reader is given Tribe's viewpoint before he has seen the material with
which he can assess the validity of those opinions. Second, the book is packed with
cross-references; a full understanding of particular chapters will be difficult without
some familiarity with other chapters or even the whole book. For example, first
amendment principles are cross-referenced with the pregnancy disability equal
protection cases in an attempt to show that both doctrines rest on values such as
the promotion of "breathing space" and "room for freely chosen role change." Id.
1074. Third, the order in which some material is presented will create difficulties.
For example, state action is covered last, and rights of political participation (including many equal protection cases, of course) are covered before equal protection.
Finally, some of the material is simply hard to follow. Particularly obscure, I
thought, were part of the discussion of Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1
(1974), L. TRmIE, supra note 1, at 988-89, the chapter on Model VII, "Structural
Justice," id. 1137-46, and the chapter on state action, id. 1147-74.
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is also sometimes propagandistic., Occasionally suggestive of radical
ideology, Tribe's positions can also be politically moderate. 7 Like
Whitman's writing, Professor Tribe's is exuberant, detailed, innocent, momentous, and even silly in places.
Of the many characteristics of this large and sophisticated book,
I wish to single out one for attention here. Although Tribe's arguments can be exotic-even mystical 8-and although some of his
specific positions are not conventionally accepted, one of the most
important aspects of this book is the extent to which it forcefully
and openly exploits an approach to constitutional law that is widely
shared by judges and legal scholars. This approach, which will be
described in section I, assumes that constitutional law is fundamentally the application of reason to public issues; it attempts to
create from the lawyer's skill of intelligent, conscious argumentation a moral charter capable of ordering almost any aspect of human
conduct. Because Tribe is so able and enthusiastic in presenting a
comprehensive synthesis of the methods and products of this approach, he unwittingly reveals the quixotic habits of thought
upon which the increasingly pervasive influence of constitutional law rests.

To the extent that American ConstitutionalLaw

powerfully captures-even, perhaps, caricatures-the essence of the
6 The recurrent arguments that doctrine should not be used to hide underlying
moral judgments were especially honest and useful. See, e.g., id. 571-74, 890-92,
991. However, Tribe's use of adjectives is frequently propagandistic. For example,
the one-man, one-vote principle is described as a "straightforward notion." Id. 740.
See also note 3 supra. Moreover, Tribe occasionally offers gratuitous examples of
cultural bias. It is "clear" to him that "many of the concerns expressed by
opponents [of the Equal Rights Amendment] are exaggerated, and that much
opposition . . . derives from an unwillingness to accept those new responsibilities
which may accompany the . . . new rights."

L. TamE, supra note 1, at 1075.

Tribe also opines, "[the] suppression of the obscene persists because it tells us
something about ourselves that some of us, at least, would prefer not to know."
Id. 669.
7 For example, Tribe offers a tolerant assessment of the Burger Court's performance in protecting the constitutional rights of the poor:
The vision animating this mix of aspirations is plainly not an
egalitarian one, but it is not without its own elements of decency and
concern; whatever the doctrinal strains, the Burger Court will not refuse
lifelines to those about to drown, even if it will throw them from a point
perched safely above the disquieting signs of distress-a point from which
the struggle to survive may not always be visible at all.
Id. 1135 (footnote omitted). He also shows a certain amount of sympathy for the
rights of communities to control their members for "moral" purposes. Id. 898.
8
See, e.g., Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations
for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974). In the treatise, the same
characteristic appears in Tribe's rather grand formulations of constitutional values,
see text accompanying notes 14-22 infra, and in his insistence that those values
represent a "shared social vision," see note 56 infra. Romanticism is not inconsistent with Tribe's "rationalism," the characteristic emphasized in this Review.
See notes 60 & 67 infra.
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modem enterprise of the same name, the book should seriously
embarrass the enterprise. The effort to establish a virtuous social
order by the force of intelligence, exercised by an elite of lawyerphilosophers, represents a dangerously narrow view of the governmental process. If the book gives pause to some of the lawyers,
judges, and scholars who are busily engaged in exercising and rationalizing their own disproportionate influence on the nation's
affairs, it will have accomplished an unintended but useful result.
I. TRIBE AND

CONSTITUTIONAL RATIONALISM

Some of the trappings of the book push a modernistic intellectual style past what can be taken seriously. Does modem rationalism honor experimentalism? Then the venerable "antimajoritarian difficulty" may be dealt with by a delphic account of a
key-pecking experiment on pigeons that tends to show that pigeons,
at least (how suggestive!), can be taught to delay gratification.9
Does mathematics connote intellectual rigor? Then simple diagramming may be labeled "triangulating," 10 and the process of defining
acceptable legislative objectives may be described as arriving at an
"acceptable set of [the] allowable definitions of harm";:" even the
future course of human progress can be plotted, making "the trajectory of change.., apparent." 12 Is scientific theorizing dependent
on model-building? Then constitutional law may be organized
around descriptive categories impressively called "models." 13 Is
psycholology stylish and even (perhaps) scientific? Then the first
amendment protects the "right to shape the 'self' that one presents
to the world" 14 and the right to limit "life's informational traces." 15
Do the sciences, at the edges of their development, employ strange,
provocative terminology such as the term "anti-matter" in modern
physics? Then modern constitutional theory must have "anti-doctrine." 16
9 L. ThBE, supra note 1, at 10.

10 Id. 112.
11 Id. 981. See also id. 938-41, 975.
12 Id. 1138.

13 The book divides constitutional law into seven categories: "The Model of
Separated and Divided Powers," "The Model of Implied Limitations on Government," "The Model of Settled Expectations," "The Model of Governmental Regularity," "The Model of Preferred Rights," "The Model of Equal Protection," and a
"Model of Structural justice."
14 Id. 966.

-5Id. 974.
16lId. 1149.
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This overlay of fancy terminology is only stylistic and-aside
from the possibility of implying a false similarity between law and
science-would seem to be only a matter of taste. However, these
trappings are also suggestive of a deeper and more widely shared
defect: an over-estimation of the place of rationalism in government.
Modern constitutional analysis is sophisticated. Constitutional
text and history are almost never decisive; they provide only a
starting point for moral discourse by lawyers and judges on the appropriateness of the possible rules of law. The moral argumentation, however, is (usually) not divorced entirely from the Constitution. The preferred method of analysis is to examine text, history,
political theory, social facts, and other sources in order to identify a
value that should be accorded constitutional status. Because constitutional significance is not tied to specific language or history, the
value is necessarily both important and vague; hence, almost any
issue can have constitutional dimensions, and the value alone cannot
explain case outcomes. The value is tied to the facts of cases by an
intricate structure of intermediate doctrine that is announced and
modified in the case law. The doctrines are sufficiently complicated and elastic to permit adaptation to changing social or moral
conditions and to allow for a degree of outcome determinativeness.
Constitutional analysis, then, involves the articulation of basic social
values and the manipulation of doctrine; in this manner, specific
decisions can be legitimized by reference to basic rules that have
been consented to by hypothesis and to intermediate doctrines that
gain their moral authority from the development of case law and
from rational explanation.
Professor Tribe's analyses illustrate, with a vengeance, the freedom and significance that characterize constitutional argument in
such a system. In Tribe's view, the values protected by procedural
due process (the "primary encounter with the decisionmaker" 17)
are nothing less than "personal dignity and autonomy" 18 and "the
minimization of subservience and helplessness." 19 The right of
association should be understood as "facilitating the emergence of
relationships that meet the human need for closeness, trust, and
love . . . without which there can be no hope of solving the persistent problem of autonomy and community." 20 Equal protection
17 Id. 557.
18 Id. 560.

19 Id.
20 Id. 988.
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prevents the imposition of "traditional roles," 21 and ultimately preserves "equality and autonomy." 22 The first amendment protects
those choices that constitute an "individual's psyche." 23 In short,
the various preferred rights should be described at no less a level
of generality than that of protections of "personhood," 24 of "the
essence of personality," 2-of "'the essential dignity and worth of
every human being,' "26 and of "the elements of being human." 2!
If these constitutional objectives sound romantic, Tribe makes an
impressive case that the Supreme Court consciously seeks traces of
grand values in constitutional provisions and then explodes the
meaning of those provisions so that they stand for the grand value
itself.
As Tribe demonstrates, constitutional values are stated at exalted levels of abstraction partly because modem sophistication,
having liberated judges from the confines of text and history, has
liberated constitutional values from specificity as well.28 The
exalted nature of the values is also a corollary to assumptions about
constitutionalism itself: the Constitution, Tribe and others suggest,
necessarily must address the most serious public concerns, and must
achieve a result that can be seen as virtuous in order to be worthy
21 Id. 1068.
22 Id. 1012.
23Id. 910.
24 Id. 914.
25 Id. 892.
26Id. 969 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
concrring) ).
27 Id. 574.
28
For an example of the treatment of history, see Tribe's account of the
meaning of the religion clauses. Id. 813, 814 n.5, 815. More generally he explains:
Both the Court and various commentators have explored the historical
background of the first amendment in order to guide interpretation of the
two religion clauses, but here as elsewhere, "too literal [a] quest for the
advice of the Founding Fathers" is often futile. The historical record is
ambiguous, and many of today's problems were of course never envisioned
by any of the Framers. Under these circumstances, one can only examine
the human values and historical purposes underlying the religion clauses
to decide what doctrinal framework might best realize those values and
purposes today.
Id. 816 (footnotes omitted).
Tribe does not ignore the value of textual analysis, but states that it "invites
collaborative inquiry . . . into the contemporary contents . . . of freedom,
fairness, and fraternity." Id. 566. Ultimately, Tribe finds not only history and
text, but also doctrine, philosophy, sociology, religion, and astronomy insufficient
bases for constitutional interpretation-proper results can be achieved only by
rational analysis of consequences. See id. 890-91.
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of its fundamental status.2 9 Any "imperfections" in the document
must be remedied by interpretation.
If a value is stated abstractly enough, it will have broad relevance to human affairs, important or petty. As Tribe demonstrates,
American constitutional law is becoming pervasive; it does not necessarily decide all issues, but almost all issues must at least be subjected to constitutional analysis. The Constitution influences decisions about the details of aid to parochial schools,3 0 almost any
aspect of the political process,31 school dress codes,3 2 ombudsmen,3 3
psychiatric treatment, motorcycle helmets,5 the distribution of
40
39
38
37
wealth,36 sexual preferences, beer-drinking, hair length, dying,
family life 41-the list is virtually endless.
Neither Tribe nor modern judges are so naive as to believe that
grandly stated values can directly determine case outcomes. That
the courts have embarked on the "larger enterprise of identifying
the elements of being human" 42 surely does not fully explain why
a husband's right to raise a child is less important than a wife's
right to abort that child; 43 the "deeper concerns of personhood" "
29

In discussing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Tribe quotes
Professor Charles Black with approval:
If our constitutional law could permit such a thing to happen, then we
might almost as well not have any law of constitutional limitations, partly
because the thing is so outrageous in itself, and partly because a constitutional law inadequate to deal with such an outrage would be too feeble,
in method and doctrine, to deal with a very great amount of equally
outrageous material. Virtually all the intimacies, privacies and autonomies
of life would be regulable by the legislature .
L. TamE, supra note 1, at 571 (citation omitted).
30For example, textbooks can be supplied to the pupils (not to the schools),
and can be stored on school premises "at times," but projectors, maps, globes, etc.
cannot be supplied even to parents. Id. 842. Public support can be provided for
guidance and various forms of therapy, but such services must be provided off
school grounds. However, locations close to the school are constitutionally
acceptable. Id. 843.
31k this realm, constitutional decisionnaking includes not only such structural
considerations as legislative apportionment, but also judgments about how quickly
the legislature should respond to demands for change. See note 72 infra.
32 L. TamE, supra note 1, at 958-59.
33 Id. 562.
34 Id. 910-13.
35 Id. 938-41.
36 Id.
37 Id.

1116-35.
941-48.

38 Id. 1065-66.
39 Id. 961-64.
40 Id.

934-37.

41 Id.985-90.
42 Id. 574.
43
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (holding
spousal consent provision of state abortion law unconstitutional).
44 L. TRmE, supra note 1, at 650.
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have only an obscure relevance to whether Stanley should be prohibited from reading obscenity in his home. 45 Thus Tribe describes in imaginative detail how the generality of the value and the
specificity of the case can begin to be connected by doctrine. The
artful use of doctrine helps to bridge the gap, or at least appears to,
by posing such questions as whether a group is an ordinary loser
in the political process or a "discrete and insular minority"; 46
whether the decisionmakers' motivations were merely dubious or
"invidious"; 474 8whether a governmental interest is "legitimate" or
"compelling";

whether speech is "track one" or "track two";

49

whether a legislative classification is "suspect," "semi-suspect," or
merely "sensitive." 50 Constitutional values are not absolute, and
judges "balance" interests or identify "less restrictive alternatives." 5.
Not every issue is finally determined by the Constitution, but every
intermediate
issue can be classified as triggering "mere rationality,....
review," or "strict scrutiny." 52 The gap between the general value
and the specific case is bridged by an avalanche of explanation, the
complexity and awkwardness of which Tribe savors even when it is
entirely unhelpful: "As we will see .

. . ,

the reference to less re-

strictive alternatives in the context of facial overbreadth challenges,
particularly where government has acted in terms of expressive content and is thus subjected to track-one scrutiny, is essentially conclusory ...... 53

Prolix constitutional doctrine provides room for maneuvering;
while erecting doctrinal explanations, a sensitive eye can be cast
on the outcome of the case. That realization appears to add some
cynicism to the elaborateness of the moral discourse:
The eventual unfolding of doctrine in this area will
confront one methodological problem ....

Insofar as the

right of personhood is limited to liberties long revered as
fundamental in our society, it makes all the difference in
the world what level of generality one employs to test the
45

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).

46

Are users of mind-altering drugs a discrete and insular minority? See L.
TRmE, supra note 1, at 908-10, 937. Are homosexuals? See id. 944-46; text
accompanying notes 54-55 infra.
47 Id. 1028-32.

48 Id. 791.
49 Id. 580-84.
50ld. 1080, 1090.
51 See, e.g., id. 722, 846, 999 n.17.
52 See, e.g., id. 1000-60; 1082-97.
53 Id. 687.
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pedigree of an asserted liberty claim. Plainly, the history
of homosexuality has been largely a history of disapproval
and disgrace; indeed, it would not be wholly implausible to
suggest... that homosexuals form virtually a discrete and
insular minority ....
It is crucial, in asking whether an
alleged right forms part of a traditional liberty, to define
the liberty at a high enough level of generality to permit
unconventional variants to claim protection. .

.

. The

proper question, then, is whether the intimacy of private
sexual acts reflects a traditionally revered liberty . . .54
Thus homosexuality becomes one of the traditional liberties; but
Tribe, earnest in his argument, denies that this formulation is a
"mere concoction for litigation purposes." 55
Modern constitutional analysis results in a pervasive moral
code of the sort one might expect to emerge as the piecemeal
product of individual decisions or the elective process. But Tribe
assumes that the constitutional code in its abstract form has been
consented to, not in that it represents an original social contract,
but in that it is a "shared social vision." 51 In this scheme, the
actual constitutional outcome gains its moral force from the exercise of intelligence, from the reasonableness of the court's analysis
and explanation in its decision:
Although relevant factors can be identified, neither
the artistry nor the archaeology of constitutional doctrine
can determine finally the extent to which such a right of
personhood, and of enough privacy to develop and function
as an individual and to share intimacies with others, can be
asserted against governmental control or deliberate governmental indifference. To make sense for constitutional
law out of the smorgasbord of philosophy, sociology, religion, history, and even astronomy upon which our humanity subsists, we must turn from absolute propositions
and dichotomies so as to place each allegedly protected
action, and each allegedly invalid intrusion, in its social
context. The inquiry must examine likely results. It
must seek out submerged classifications or differential impacts .... In each case, it will be necessary to ask: Who
54Id. 944-46 (emphasis added).
55 Id.946.
56 Id. 999. Whether the "shared" quality of the vision is an attribute to be
measured or is a postulate remains unclear. See Ely, Forward: On Discovering
FundamentalValues, 92 HAxv. L. lEv. 5, 43-52 (1978).
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is being hurt? Who benefits? By what process is the rule
imposed? For what reasons?57
Constitutional decisionmaking as described and advocated by
Professor Tribe has a readily identifiable place in modem intellectual traditions: Professor Michael Oakeshott has described the
general approach as "rationalism." 58 "Rational" conduct, which
should not be confused with "sensible" or "efficient" conduct, 59 is
"behavior deliberately directed to the achievement of a formulated
purpose and governed solely by that purpose." 1o Constitutional
rationalism is a variable, free-floating demand that the objectives of
policies be consciously articulated, that information concerning the
"likely results" of policies be gathered and analyzed, and that the
"reasons" for the chosen policies be justifiable.6 '
In short, the enterprise of American constitutional law justifies its broad influence on public policy by identifying rationalism
with legitimacy, somewhat as the law generally tends to confuse
good argument with good policy. No doubt, nearly any system for
enforcing constitutional values requires some use of the intellectual
methods of rationalism, and the critics of rationalism acknowledge
that it has a useful (but limited) place in the formulation of public
57Id. 890-91.
58M. OAxESHOTT,

ATioNAraS
nw Pomrncs (1962).
59 Indeed, an extended effort has been made to show that conscious, goaldirected decisionmaking is often irrational in the sense that it is relatively unlikely
to achieve or maximize desired outcomes. See C. IaNDBLom, THE I=zrxaGcnc
or DEmocRAcy (1965).
The term "rationalism" should not be misunderstood as
a general synonym for all intellectual methods of moral inquiry, for Oakeshott
himself engages in a highly intellectual form of moral discourse.
60M. OAuEHSnor, supra note 58, at 83 (emphasis in original). Oakeshott's
description of rationalism is subtle and difficult to summarize. He describes the
rationalist as
the enemy of authority, of prejudice, of the merely traditional, customary
or habitual. [T]here is no opinion, no habit, no belief . . . that he
hesitates to question. . . and to judge . . . by what he calls his "reason";
the Rationalist never doubts the power of his "reason" . . . to
determine the worth of a thing . . . or the propriety of an action.
Id. 1-2 (emphasis in original). The rationalist deals in "technical knowledge' that
is "susceptible of formulation in rules, principles, directions, maxims-comprehensively, in propositions." Id. 10. Since the rationalist seeks to categorize moral
sensibilities into abstract statements, he has a fascination with doctrine: "[The
rationalist believes that] in order to participate in politics and expect a hearing, it
is necessary to have ... a doctrine; not to have a doctrine appears frivolous .... "
Id. 22. Tribe's coupling of a highly rationalistic style with rather grand and
romantic statements of constitutional values is presaged by Oakeshott, who refers
to "[t]he odd generation of rationalism in politics . . . by sovereign power out
of romanticism." Id. 7.
61For an example of Tribe's conception of constitutional rationalism, see L.
TnmE, supra note 1, at 890-91.
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policy. 2 However, if the democratic process requires significant
departures from the methods of rationalism, the exuberant demand
for pervasive rationalism in government begins to sound, like Whitman, naive and self-important.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL RATIOnALISM AND THE
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

Although rationalism is no doubt compatible with traditional
judicial methods, an unconfined demand for rationalism in government is not desirable or realistic in a democracy. Treating social
choices as a series of intellectual problems is reassuring to many in
the educated classes, but, as Tribe's book illustrates, rationalism
tends to denigrate important values and severely limits the usefulness of the legislative process.
A. ConstitutionalRationalism and Public Policy
1. Policies not asserted to further independently articulated
values are disfavored. Because rationalism emphasizes the conscious
evaluation of whether a policy will achieve its objective, policies
for which such analysis is unnecessary are unappreciated. If a
governmental decision is based on a value that is not usefully articulated independently from the decision itself, the exercise of matching means (policies) to ends (objectives) is disappointingly unnecessary. With a policy implementing a personal taste, for example, the
objective is indistinguishable from the policy. If a school requires
boys to wear short hair because the school officials think that short
hair looks good on boys, it is unnecessary to ask whether the policy
will achieve its objective. Constitutional rationalism, therefore, implicitly disfavors policies that are best justified on the basis of
preference alone.63 The defendants in the hair-length litigation
62Oakeshott, for example, acknowledges that the rationalists "technical"
knowledge has a place in any activity. M. OAKESHOTT, supra note 58, at 7-12.
Lindblom also is careful to acknowledge that there is a place for more than one
kind of decisionmaking. C. LsnBLOM, supra note 59, at 13.
63

Tribe states:
Any acceptable set of allowable definitions of harm would seem to
rule out, as an ordinarily inadmissible reason to restrict fundamental
rights, the "harm" of finding a person or act unpleasant to behold or to
contemplate.

If simply finding another's appearance or habits offensive

. . . were enough to justify exclusionary regulation, rights of personhood
' * ' would be at an end.
L. TsumE, supra note 1, at 981. See also id. 965.
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described by Tribe were aware of the judicial solicitude for meansends analysis and attempted to justify their policy by reference to
some objective other than personal preference. They desperately
sought to link long hair to communist conspiracies or to confusion
in the use of restrooms. The foolishness of such justifications does
not demonstrate that the policy is "wrong," but that the courts are
imposing an inapposite demand for some justification other than
"personal distaste." " Tribe's somewhat arrogant suggestion that
judicial protection of long hair might help the public "come to its
senses" 15 confuses the judicial suppression of local authority over
matters of taste with intellectual or, perhaps, aesthetic enlightenment.
Personal preferences are not necessarily inferior bases for public
policy, a fact that rationalists tend to recognize only when their own
strong preferences are at stake.66 An asserted interest in protecting
potential human life, for example, although not trivial by any
standard, need not be justified by reference to any external value
or result. Finding a connection between an independently-stated
objective and a "rational" policy yields a satisfying sense of reasonableness, but the policy is not intrinsically better than one that
is justified entirely by preference or taste. The reason for favoring
the independent objective, after all, is often a matter of preference,
too. For instance, to adopt a policy permitting abortion on the
grounds that such a right will result in women being able to avoid
"distressful" lives, or even to achieve "personhood," is ultimately
an indirect expression of preference for those results. At any rate,
to the extent that constitutional rationalism forces decisionmakers
to explain their decisions in terms of relatively remote relationships
between policies and their objectives, absurd objectives will be postulated and important values can be unfairly trivialized. 67 Constitu64 Id.

963.

65 Id. 964.

66 In some places Tribe argues that certain constitutional values need no instrumental justification. For example, procedural due process is said to be intrinsically
important for the opportunity to confront the decisionmaker without regard to other
values such as accuracy of fact-finding. Id. 554.
67 At one point, Tribe acknowledges that "nothing in . . . [Roe v. Wade]
provides a satisfactory explanation of why the fetal interest should not be deemed
" Id. 927. However, he later explains:
overriding prior to viability ....
Thus, on the record before it, and in view of realities too commonplace to be ignored, the Court might understandably have viewed restrictive abortion laws less as meaningful protections for unborn life than
as relatively pointless and economically skewed expressions of outdated
worry about the health of the women . . . coupled with disapproval of
...
their moral choices.
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tional rationalism therefore interferes heavily with the democratic process on those issues that are least amenable to rational
solution-issues that involve the divergent personal preferences of
competing interest groups.
2. Policies based on tradition are disfavored. Rationalism
tends to disapprove of policies that are based on tradition because
traditional policies are seen as being reflexive rather than as being
the products of conscious thought.6 8 Thus Tribe holds that "the
differential treatment of men and women is constitutional only
when it is demonstrable that the difference is not the accidental
consequence of a tradition-bound way of thinking ...

but is inten-

designed." ' 19

The "irrational" quality
tionally and reasonably
of reliance on traditional values is so intolerable to the constitutional rationalist that the absence of social change is itself evidence
that the political system is malfunctioning. Accordingly, Tribe
argues that the intermediate level of equal protection review should
be triggered "when the legislative and administrative processes seem
systemically resistant to change." 70
Obviously, it is possible for a person to resist change for no
reason other than his appreciation of the present; 71 for such a perId. 931. Thus Tribe discredits the asserted state interest partly by assessing it as
if it were not a value in itself but as an ineffective ("pointless") means for
achieving some independent objective (health or the morality of personal
responsibility).
Oddly, the rationalists impulse to identify independent objectives can cause
him to strain in the formulation even of objectives of which he approves. Thus
Tribe insistently attempts to relate perfectly sensible (if modest) constitutional
values to some other values; for example, the "intrinsic" value of procedural due
process in permitting individuals to "talk back" to decisionmakers cannot be left to
stand or fall on its own-the value is later related to the larger and different values
of "personal dignity and autonomy." Id. 560. Hence Tribe's constant postulation
of romantic constitutional values, see text accompanying notes 18-27 supra, can
be seen to be consistent with the rationalists demand for means-ends analysis. See
note 60 supra. With respect to the implications of constitutional rationalism on
moral justifications for governmental policy, see text accompanying notes 77-80
infra.
68 M. OAKEsHor, supra note 58, at 1. Oakeshott argues that the rationalist
is unlikely properly to understand or value traditions: "Like a foreigner or a man
out of his social class, he is bewildered by a tradition . . . of which he knows only
the surface . . . . And he conceives a contempt for what he does not understand ....... .Id. 31. For indications that both Tribe and the Court hold the
traditions of at least some classes in contempt, see note 74 infra.
69
L. TRaBE, supra note 1, at 1070. Tribe describes the constitutional "evil"
to be avoided as "a traditional way of thinking about females." Id. 1087 (citation omitted). See also id. 1068, 1080.
70 Id. 1091-92.
71 For a sympathetic account of this conservative impulse, see M. OAEs Horr,
supra note 58, at 168-96.
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son, to attempt to "perpetuate habitual assumptions by blocking...
exposure" to the consequences of change is not, as Tribe suggests,
somehow illegitimate, 72 but a normal effort to protect perceived
self-interest. That representative government might reflect such
preferences (and thus expose some people to the risks of "rigidity
to change" 73) is no more objectionable than a majoritarian preference for discovering the consequences of change (thus exposing the
conservative person to unwanted risks).
The felt interests of those who hold affection for tradition are
likely to be systematically ignored by constitutional rationalists.
Indeed, the Court has demonstrated considerable insensitivity to
traditional values regarding the relationship between parent and
child, between husband and wife, between the sexes, and in other
areas. 74

Customs, traditions, and their accompanying styles of

thought (pejoratively termed "stereotypes" by constitutional rationalists) should not, of course, always win or always lose in the
political process. However, to envision the Constitution as requiring a continuing presumptive hostility to the past creates a serious
danger that courts will prevent people from building a coherent
knowledge and sense of morality.7 5 Moreover, it carries the risk
that certain groups will come to see the Constitution as an alien
There is good reason to conclude that
72 L. TRBmE, supra note 1, at 1091.
Tribe partially identifies "rigidity" according to whether he disapproves of the
outcome of the legislative process, not by evidence of any lack of responsiveness.
The fact that prior to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), there was considerable
legislative activity regarding abortion laws would seem to indicate that the legislative process was not reluctant to deal with that issue. Tribe, however, suggests
that the "entanglement of religious issues in the process"-not illegitimate in
itself--somehow rendered the process too "rigid." The term "rigid" in this context
apparently does not refer to a failure to respond to constituent concerns, but to a
failure to respond to the correct constituents. See id. 929-30.
73 Id. 1091.
74
Most notable, perhaps, are the Court's assertions that neither a fetus' father
nor a pregnant girl's parents have any interest in the abortion decision that is
distinct from the interest of the state itself. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-75 (1976). Decisions in other areas raise similar questions. Serious commentary has suggested that some school desegregation orders
have been prompted by a class-bias that prevents judges from crediting the
traditional goals of the working class. See, e.g., L. RuBn, BusiN AND BAcisAsH
149-52 (1972). The Court has been so insensitive to the traditional punitive
aspect of the criminal law that on one occasion it neglected to mention retribution
at all when itemizing the legitimate purposes of incarceration. Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974) ("legitimate" penal objectives are deterrence, protection of society, and rehabilitation). For similar insensitivities, see Carey v.
Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (insensitivity to protection of "potential
life"); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (insensitivity to "special needs" of
partisan politics).

75 See M. OAxssHoTr, supra note 58, at 105.
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document, used by segments of the educated classes to belittle and
undermine their ways of life710
3.Policiesthat have complex or vague objectives are disfavored.
Rationalism searches for conclusive answers to questions and "consequently the question must be formulated in such a way that it
admits of such an answer." 77 If the values behind a rule are too
subtle or varied for easy articulation and measurement, the rationalist will tend to oversimplify the objective so that its accomplishment can be accurately assessed7 8 Tribe, for example, finds
only frustration in defending the Supreme Court's recent creation
of a constitutional right to abortion as long as he acknowledges the
state's moral purpose of protecting future life; but if the objectives
of restrictive abortion laws can be recast as "economically skewed
expressions of outdated worry about the health of the women" he
finds the defense much easier.79 Because some of society's important interests, such as the maintenance of a moral climate, are
necessarily pursued in an indirect and partial way, constitutional
rationalism tends to undervalue, ignore, or distort important values.8 0
4. Policies justified after implementation are disfavored. Tribe
states, "However weighty an objective, however closely it might fit
the challenged rule, and however persuasively it is currently articulated . . . that objective should not be credited . . .if there are

convincing reasons to believe that the objective is being supplied
purely by hindsight .... ,,81 On its face breathtakingly foolish, this
requirement is comprehensible only as an expression of the assumptions of rationalism. The fundamental objective of rationalism is
not a rule that is (or turns out to be) wise or fair; the objective is
the rational formulation of policy. If the value was not articulated
76 An argument has been made that the abortion issue, for example, is essentially
a matter of class differences, see Skerry, The Class Conflict Over Abortion, 52 PFu.
INTEmEsT 69 (1978). See also L. RuBiN, supra note 74 (class aspects of desegregation decisions). For other comments on the class bias in Supreme Court
decisions, see Ely, supra note 56, at 12; Tushnet, . . . And Only Wealth Will
Buy You Justice-Some Notes on the Supreme Court 1972 Term, 1974 Wis. L.
REv. 177.
77 M. OA ESHOTT, supra note 58, at 84.

781Id. See generally Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YAiE LJ. 123 (1972).
'19
L. TamE, supra note 1, at 931. See note 67 supra.
80 For an example, see note 67 supra.
81

L. Tnm,

supra note 1, at 1085.
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before the policy was adopted, conscious analysis could not have
2
been employed in formulating the policy.8
One view of morality holds that moral values cannot be known
independently of the activities to which they refer, for "the objects
of our desires are known to us in the activity of seeking them." s3
Even if policy objectives sometimes can be adequately stated prior
to implementation, it is nevertheless clear that important values
can also be discovered during the performance of an activity.
Constitutional rationalism disfavors such values and frustrates policies that are no less important for having been justified by experience.
Even if it were true that all important values could be known
and stated in advance of implementation of a policy, a practical
decisionmaker might well embark on some activities before finally
formulating his objective. Because the potential consequences of
an important program are often unlimited, decisionmakers often
lack the resources to gather or evaluate all the relevant information.s4 Accordingly, it is often desirable to begin a tentative program and incrementally to reformulate both the objectives and the
means chosen for their achievement in light of actual experience. s5
The reformulated objectives can differ dramatically from the
original, tentative objective."" Constitutionalism that requires a
decisionmaker to identify consequences (and relate them to an articulated value) before acting can result in the abandonment of
potentially useful activity.
5. Policies without empirical validation are disfavored. The

process of "rational" policy formation requires that alternate means
be compared and that policies be justified as achieving some preferred mix of the relevant values. Therefore, even when courts
permit decisionmakers to discover their objectives post hoc, courts
will often insist that evidence be furnished that the policy actually
s2 Tribe seeks to justify the rule on the grounds that the decisionmaker will
be encouraged to "ventilate more fully the considerations underlying those enactments." Id. 1086. He adds that even were the rule to encourage the false
creation of a record in anticipation of litigation, it still "deprives the enacting body

of nothing it deliberately (and properly) sought." Id. (emphasis added).
8M. OAKEsroTr, supra note 58, at 105. Cf. C. LINDBLOM, supra note 59,
at 142 (discussing impossibility of declaring and considering all values and consequences before implementation of policy decisions).
84 Id. 137-39.

85 Id. 146-47.
86 For a provocative argument on the need to disregard the known costs of an
activity in order to discover unknowable potential benefits, see Gilder, Prometheus
Bound, HApm's MAoAznME, Sept. 1978, at 35.
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achieves its purpose. The requirement of what Tribe calls a "close
fit" 87 between ends and means is only one form of the demand for
validation. The requirement that a rule be the "least restrictive
alternative" for achieving a governmental objective permits courts
to speculate-on the basis of their own knowledge or empirical
evidence-whether (and how effectively) a different policy might
achieve the same social goal.
These demands-that decisions be justified by proof of their
consequences or by proof that the same consequences could not be
achieved some other way-disadvantage policies with effects that are
difficult to isolate and identify. There is, however, no reason to
assume that important social decisions will be limited to those areas
for which information is readily available and susceptible to conclusive analysis. Indeed, the more important the policy, the more
likely it is that it will have far-reaching impacts that are difficult to
measure. In such areas, decisionmakers typically must act in the
absence of full information. 8s This phenomenon is equally applicable to judicial decisionmaking. In Craig v. Boren,8 9 the Court
demanded hard statistics on the relative frequency of drunken driving by males and females in order to determine whether a genderbased statute on the sale of beer was justified; its own decision,
however, was based on speculation as to the effects of stereotyping
on the sexes. Similarly, when courts seek to determine whether
alternative means exist for the achievement of governmental objectives, the potentially unlimited number of policy alternatives and
consequences renders full information prohibitively expensive.
When they engage in such analysis, therefore, courts do not demand actual proof that other policies can achieve the desired goal;
instead, they rely on judicial notice and speculation.9" The difference between courts and other decisionmakers in this regard is
that courts often are no longer involved in the controversy when
information about the effects of their policies does begin to become available; or, if still involved, courts have special reasons for
being unreceptive to the new information. 91 At any rate, requir87

L. TMBE, supra note 1, at 1083.

C. LINDBLOm, supra note 59, at 139-42.
89429 U.S. 190 (1976).
90
E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637 (1969) (state can prevent
fraud in welfare programs by newcomers by "investigation" and "cooperation among
state welfare departments.").
91The courts may become uninvolved simply because the "case" has been
terminated. Even when new cases are initiated, many characteristics of the
judicial process discourage receptivity to new information. The original decision
may have been rationalized as a matter of principle. In addition, the need for
88
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ing a close empirical "fit" between policy and objective could subvert highly important judicial policies, just as it subverts important
legislative policies.
B. Constitutional Rationalism and the Legislative
Process
Professor Tribe dismisses institutional questions as having only
limited relevance because the "Constitution's implicit vision of a
just society" is binding on legislators as well as on judges.9 2 Because Tribe treats the Constitution as a moral code with potential
relevance to any issue, this dismissal amounts to an admonition that
legislators should generally utilize the same decisionmaking methodology as judges. Tribe's general advocacy of active judicial review
would assure that the results of the legislative process do in fact
reflect a "rational" approach to policymaking. Constitutional
rationalism, then, is not only to be imposed on all decisionmakers
by judicial review, but ultimately is to be internalized by them as
well.
If the failure of legislators to act "rationally" triggers and controls active constitutional scrutiny, the judiciary inevitably will be
very busy tidying up government. Legislators do not always know
or articulate moral objectives before enacting programs and frequently rationalize them to their constituents only afterwards.
When legislators do announce values before adopting programs, the
announced values are often either concocted or, at least, subject to
being altered to reflect subsequent experience with the policy.
They attempt to accommodate complex and hopelessly conflicting
values in the same policy. After announcing grand objectives, they
quickly alter or renounce these goals in subsequent legislation.
They respond to wildly irrational arguments and even to power
unadorned by intellectual argumentation. No legislator hears or
knows of all the affected interests before a decision. Legislators
decisional consistency discourages acknowledgement of new information even when

the original decision was overtly based on empirical information. For example,
school desegregation orders are still entered on the premise that separate schooling
instills a feeling of inferiority in minority students that affects educational performance, see Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954), despite the
discrediting of the original data upon which that premise was based. See material
cited in P. BnxsT, PaocmssEs oF CoNsrrrunoNrAL DEcSoNmAKING 461 n.20
(1975). Moreover, a single judge or panel of judges provides only limited points
of access for new information and a limited number of perspectives (and, therefore,
less sensitivity to the importance of new information). For a general discussion of
the tendencies of central, unitary decisionmakers to be rigid in their use of new
information, see C. LINDBLOM, supra note 59, at 196-98, 230-31.
92
L. TAmE, supra note 1, at 13-14.
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rarely possess in advance full information about the consequences
of a decision, and they do not necessarily pay any attention to the
information they do have. Compared to the detached, careful evaluation of briefs and evidence in light of an explicit, consistent
set of legal values that is the ideal of the judicial process, the legislative process is a nightmare of irrational decisionmaking.
Legislative "irrationality," however, provides real advantages
to a democratic system. 93 If values need not be formally articulated
and consistently pursued, legislators can serve many interests at
once. Strongly held interests are unlikely to be ignored. Legislators are free to respond to intensity as well as to articulateness,
so that groups whose values are difficult to formalize or explain,
but are nonetheless strongly held, can be accommodated without
embarrassment. Even if no one objective is fully achieved, many
groups can be partially satisfied and can therefore be expected to
retain some sense of loyalty to the governmental process. Because
negotiation and trading "across substantive fields" are encouraged
the hard sacrifices that different allocations of resources require
are implicitly recognized. 94 In the bartering process, people with
widely divergent interests are compelled to deal with each other
and to recognize the probable costs that their own preferences will
inflict on others; thus new understandings and new values emerge
as citizens experience firsthand the processes of self-government.9 5
Because compromise is necessary and abstract argument is of limited
93

Most of the discussion in this paragraph is based heavily on the work of

Lindblom, especially chapters 13-15 of TnE INTELGENcE OF DEmocnAcY. C.
IANDBTroM, supra note 59, at 192-246.
94This point is elaborated with regard to environmental decisions in E.
HAEFELE,

REPRESENTATIVE

GOVERNMENT

&

ENvmoNmEsNTAL

MANAGEMENT

131

(1973). It is also developed in C. LNDMBLOM, supra note 59, at 87-101, 151-61,
293-310.
95One might expect the principled and argumentative atmosphere of the
courtroom to discourage flexible value formation. Lindblom's discussion of the
deficiencies of "central coordination" is suggestive:
[When] all decision-making power with respect to reconciliation of decisions is in the hands of one decision maker, the decision makers whose

decisions are to be reconciled can make any demands on other decision
makers they wish with little cost to themselves. They need not face up
to the implications of their demands for others. It is the central coordinator's responsibility to make their demands effective if he rules in
their favor; and it is his responsibility to consider implications for others.
Id. 213. See also id. 206. For a slightly different argument to the effect that
informal, decentralized decisionmaking is likely to contribute to change and growth
in values, see M. OAxEsHoTT, supra note 58, at 4, 21, 64-66. Tribe himself admits
a momentary doubt about the rigidity of principled constitutional values when he
speaks of the "hubris" and conservatism "in designing and defending any absolute
right."

L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 892.
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value, groups are encouraged to find the common ground in their
positions, rather than to insist on apparently irreconcilable differences of principle. When legislators are free to act "irrationally,"
they can act even when full information about the consequences of
their decisions is unavailable. Because values need not be abstractly identified before action, and because legislators can attempt only partial effectuation of those values that are identified,
government can experiment with possible solutions, retaining the
capacity for quick reversal in the face of evidence of failure. Because information is received and evaluated by a large number of
individuals (with differing sensitivities), a legislative body can respond rapidly to a wide range of perceived imperfections in the
initial policy. The risks of taking action in an imperfectly understood world can thereby be minimized.
The legislative process need not be romanticized. It works
imperfectly and looks worse. But attempts to evaluate the integrity
of the legislative process and its products by the unconstrained
standards of constitutional rationalism threaten to sacrifice much of
the usefulness that legislatures offer democracy.
III. CONCLUSION

Professor Tribe and, increasingly, the courts bring "the social,
political, legal and institutional inheritance of . . . society before
the tribunal of . . . intellect." 96 For the Constitution to impose

such review on a limited number of issues is one thing; the power
of intellect to erect a pervasively just society is another. Lawyers
and judges will not, perhaps, be inclined to perceive or learn from
the excesses in American Constitutional Law because the book is
a celebration of the legal profession's own methods and influence.
The politics of rationalism, Oakeshott observed, "are the politics
of the politically inexperienced": 91
How appropriate rationalist politics are to the man who,
not brought up or educated to their exercise, finds himself in a position to exert political initiative and authority,
requires no emphasis. His need of it is so great that he will
have no incentive to be skeptical about the possibility of
a magic technique of politics which will remove the handicap of his lack of political education. The offer of such
a technique will seem to him the offer of salvation itself;
9 M. OAXEsHo'T, supra note 58, at 4.
97 Id. 23.
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to be told that the necessary knowledge is to be found,
complete and self-contained, in a book ... will seem, like

salvation, something almost too good to be true. 98
Judges, law clerks, litigants' lawyers, and law professors are usually
isolated from, and often ignorant of, many of the realities of the
political process, yet they exert enormous influence over public
policy. It seems likely, then, that many in our profession will
strive hard to see this very impressive but fundamentally limited
book as salvation itself.
98 Id.

